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Religious Discrimination in Employment:
Striking the Delicate Balance
I. Introduction
On December 12, 1975, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held in Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.' that an
employee had the right to observe his religion and refuse to work as
assigned on the day on which he celebrated his Sabbath.2 His
discharge for unexcused absences was held to constitute religious
discrimination proscribed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.1 Four days later, on similar facts, the Eighth Circuit reached.
the same conclusions in Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
4
These two decisions are the most recent additions to the "small but
significant" 5 number of cases addressing the issue of religious dis-
crimination in employment.
"Religious discrimination" within this context does not primarily
mean the unequal treatment of an employee or prospective employee
arising from social prejudices of an employer or labor union toward a
particular religion.6 Rather, the decisions in cases such as Draper
and Hardison have confronted a much more sensitive question:7 the
legality of religious discrimination when it is motivated not by social
prejudice concerning an employee's beliefs8 but by the economic
1. 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975), reh. denied, 527 F.2d 515 (1976).
2. Id. at 517. A refusal to work on one's Sabbath day is based not only upon
the fourth commandment but also upon a literal interpretation of other Biblical pas-
sages. "But the seventh day is the sabbath day of the Lord thy God; in it thou shalt
not do any work. . . ." Deut. 5:14 (King James). The Sabbath day is the "day
of rest ordained by God." (Nelson ed. p. 27).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
4. 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
5. Claybaugh v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Ore. 1973).
6. Such patent misconduct is expressly prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (1970) (unlawful employment practices by
an employer); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1) to (3) (1970) (unlawful employment
practices by a labor organization).
7. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 524 (6th Cir.
11975).
8. Cf. EEOC Dec. 71-1469 (3/19/71), CCH EEOC DEC 6222 (1971).
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consequences of respecting those beliefs.' The sabbatarian 0 who is
absent from an assigned shift because of religious scruples costs an
employer as much in lost productivity as if the absence were caused
by some other reason." The employee who violates the appearance
regulations of an employer for religious reasons can cost the employer
as much in lost goodwill as if another reason had motivated the
disobedience.' 2 The employee in a closed shop'8 whose religion
forbids membership in a labor union or even payment of union dues'4
deprives the union of economic support and correspondingly increas-
es the burden of membership upon other employees who lack similar
beliefs. 15 Yet if the employee is discharged or otherwise penalized
for asserting his beliefs, the effect on him is just as substantial as if he
were the victim of virulent religious prejudice. 16 The dilemma is
obvious; the solution perplexing. A "delicate balance" must be
reached 17 in determining the extent to which the religious observances
and practices of the individual employee may take precedence over
the conflicting interests of others.'"
9. A reply that is often made as an attempted defense to a charge of discrim-
ination on the basis of religion is "His religion doesn't bother me, didn't bother me
at that time, one way or the other. The fact that he could not work Saturday did."
Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 424
U.S. 942 (1976); accord, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 331 (6th Cir.
1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); EEOC Dec. 70-670
(3/30/70), CCH EEOC DEC 6141, at 4243 (1970).
10. The term "sabbatarian" will be used hereinafter to describe an employee
who observes a particular day as a Sabbath. See note 3 supra.
11. E.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 331 (6th Cir. 1970),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971), -1 CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE
523 (1972).
12. E.g., EEOC Dec. 71-2620 (6/25/71), CCH EEOC DEC. 6283, at 4501
(1971); EEOC Dec. 71-779 (12/21/70), CCH EEOC DEC. 6180, at 4305 (1970);
Eastern Greyhound Lines v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 317 N.Y.S.2d
322, 27 N.Y.2d 279, 265 N.E.2d 745 (1970).
13. A "closed shop" is one in which an employee is obligated to become a
member of a labor union as a condition of employment. Cooper v. General
Dynamics, Convair Aerosp. Div., Fort Worth Oper., 378 F. Supp. 1258, 1260 n.1
(N.D. Tex. 1974).
14. Even in a closed shop, an employee need not actually join a union so long
as he pays all dues and fees assessed against members. Linscott v. Millers Falls Co.,
316 F. Supp. 1369, 1370 (D. Mass. 1970), a/I'd, 440 F.2d 14 (ist Cir. 1971).
15. E.g., Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 402 n.6 (9th Cir.
1974); Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1971); Otten v. Balti-
more & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953); Cooper v. General Dynamics, Con-
vair Aerosp. Div., Fort Worth Oper., 378 F. Supp. 1258, 1262 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
16. The right of each individual to the free exercise of his religion is guaran-
teed. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. Claybaugh v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Ore. 1973).
18. The problem has been tersely summarized:
Defendant's position, . . . highlights one of the most important aspects of
this case, the relationship of the individual to the overwhelming institutions
of modern society. It is time that the corporation and other institutional
forms are to a large degree responsible for the current prosperity of the
United States. Institutions, however, often grow insensitive to the human
beings they encompass. Government itself has grown overwhelming. But
we must not lose sight of the paramount rights of free individuals. Protec-
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 has attempted to strike that
balance. 9  It states, inter alia,2 0 that an employer has the duty to
"reasonably accommodate" all aspects of religious beliefs, practices
and observances of an employee (or prospective employee)21 unless
the employer can demonstrate that accommodation would result in
"undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. '22 Drap-
er and Hardison each upheld the validity of this duty.23 Yet the
position of the two cases cannot be relied upon as totally representa-
tive of judicial opinion, for the rule of reasonable accommodation is
the subject of considerable controversy. For instance, within the nine
months preceding its decision in Draper, the Sixth Circuit first ap-
proved24 and subsequently questioned2 5 the validity of reasonable
tion of these inalienable rights has been the cornerstone of national policy
since the birth of this nation.
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 304 F. Supp. 1116, 1119-20 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1972) makes it an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to discriminate on the basis of religion. See note 6 and accompany-
ing text supra. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964)
defines "religion" as follows:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable
to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's reli-
gious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business.
21. "Prospective employees" are protected from discrimination on the basis of
religion. 42 'U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ('1964). The
term "prospective employee" has been defined judicially:
Both 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) and EEOC Regulation 1605.1(b) require
employers to accommodate both employees and prospective employees. The
phrase 'prospective employees' should not be treated as surplusage but
should be interpreted so as to effectuate the remedial intent of Congress to
expand religious freedom by requiring that employers must attempt to ac-
commodate the religious beliefs and practices of applicants for employment
prior to their employment to insure that an applicant can accept a job with
a clear conscience knowing that his particular religious needs have been ac-
commodated.
Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172, 179 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
23. Accord, e.g., Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 402 (9th
Cir. 1974); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir. '1972); Shaffield
v. Northrop Worldwide Aircr. Serv., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937, 941 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
In Hardison the Eighth Circuit expressly upheld the rule of reasonable accommoda-
tion against claims of invalidity based upon alleged statutory inconsistency and con-
flict with the Establishment Clause. 527 F.2d at 38-44. The Sixth Circuit's ap-
proval of the rule in Draper was implied in its application of the rule to the facts.
527 F.2d at 519.
24. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 554 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 424 U.S. 942 (1976). The Cummins decision was rendered on May 23, 1975.
25. Reid v. Memphis Pub. Co., 521 F.2d 512, 517-21 (6th Cir. 1975) (dicta
within maj. opinion). The Reid decision was rendered on August 20, 1975.
The panel which decided Cummins differed from that which decided Reid.
accommodation. The divergence of opinion and the significance of
the issues involved are reflected in the recent announcement of the
United States Supreme Court that it has granted certiorari in one of
the cases decided by the Sixth Circuit, Cummins v. Parker Seal
Co. 26
Cummins presents two issues that concern the validity of the
reasonable accommodation rule. The first 7 is whether the rule,
when first imposed by a regulation 2 of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 29 was invalid as inconsistent with the origi-
nal intent of the Civil Rights Act. 0 The second8' is whether the rule
is violative of the Establishment Clause 2 as an impermissible prefer-
ence of religion. The purpose of this comment is to address the
issues raised in Cummins and other recent decisions 3 in anticipation
of the ruling of the United States Supreme Court. It is strongly urged
that the validity of reasonable accommodation be upheld on all issues.
II. Background
A. History
On July 2, 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 3 was enacted by
the Eighty-Eighth Congress. Its purpose was to end discrimination
Judge Anthony Celebrezze heard both cases. He was joined by Phillips, C.J. and
McCree, J. on the Cummins court and by Weick and Edwards, JJ. on the Reid bench.
Judge Celebrezze wrote the lone dissent in Cummins and sided with Judge Weick on
the majority in Reid.
26. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 424 U.S. 942 (1976).
27. Id. at 547.
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1,(b) (1967).
29. Hereinafter also referred to as the EEOC.
30. Inconsistency was alleged in Reid v. Memphis Pub. Co., 521 F.2d 512, 519
(6th Cir. 1975) (dicta within maj. opinion); accord, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
429 F.2d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 1970), a!I'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689
(1971). Contra, Hardison v. TWA, 527 F.2d 33, 38 (8th Cir. .1975); Yott v. North
Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1974); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464
F.2d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir. 1972); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp.
172, 178 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Weitkenaut v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F.
Supp. 1284, 1288 (D. Vt. 1974).
31. 516 F.2d at 551.
32. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33. There is a third issue concerning the validity of the reasonable accommoda-
tion rule that was not addressed in Cummins. This issue concerns whether the provi-
sion of the Civil Rights Act that makes unequal treatment of employees permissible
if done "pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . . system" should be held subordinate
or superior to the provision requiring reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(h) (1972). The Hardison decision noted the difficulty of this question but
reserved judgment upon it. 527 F.2d at 41-42. Another crucial question is whether
union security clauses will be held superior to reasonable accommodation. See notes
239-251 and accompanying text infra. It is hoped, although not anticipated, that
these controversial issues will be addressed by the High Court in its opinion on the
questions expressly raised in Cummins.
34. Title VII of the Act, which concerns equal employment opportunities, is
found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-15 (1972).
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on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.s Title
V]1 36 of the Act provided that such discrimination by an employer
regarding the terms and conditions of employment would constitute
an unfair employment practice.3 7  Discrimination by a labor organi-
zation in its terms and conditions of membership was similarly pro-
scribed. 38  The Act established the EEOC to investigate complaints
brought under the Acts' and thereby aid in its enforcement by the
courts.4" The EEOC was also empowered to issue regulations to
effectuate the Act4' consistent with legislative purposes.42
The first such regulations 43 concerning discrimination and reli-
gious observances by employees became effective on June 15, 1966. 44
These regulations set forth the EEOC's position that an employer was
free to schedule a standard work week uniformly applicable to all
employees, despite the unequal effect that such schedule might have
upon the religious observances of individual employees. 45  The em-
35. E.g., Fagan v. National Cash Reg. Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1119 n.9 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969). The
dominant consideration was the eradication of racial discrimination as opposed to the
other types. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. at 2516 (1964);
accord, Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970).
36. Title VII went into effect on July 2, 1965, one year after its enactment.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964)
reads in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
. . .religion ....
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964)
reads in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against, any individual because of his . . . religion ....
39. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2515 (1964). The
original wording of the Act in committee gave the EEOC power to institute hearings
and issue cease-and-desist orders as well as to investigate. That proposal was re-
jected, however, because it was believed that an employer or labor union would re-
ceive a fairer adjudication within the federal courts, where the case must be tried de
novo upon appeal from an EEOC finding. Id. This may explain the statement that
"[t]he enforcement powers of the Commission are non-existent." Beverly v. Lone
Star Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 1138 (5th Cir. 1971).
40. Jackson v. Veri-Fresh Poultry, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1276, 1277 (E.D. La.
1969).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1964).
42. Jackson v. Veri-Fresh Poultry, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1276, 1277 (E.D. La.
1969).
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1966), as amended 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967).
44. Hardison v. TWA, 527 F.2d 33, 38 (8th Cir. 1975).
45. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(3) (1966), as amended 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967)
ployer was also permitted to schedule foreseeable overtime require-
ments. 46  Absent intent of the employer to discriminate on religious
grounds, an individual who accepted a job with either actual or
constructive knowledge that his regular and overtime work might
conflict with the observance of his religion was not permitted to
demand subsequent accommodation of such observances from the
employer.47  This position was based 4s upon a broad statement of
congressional intent that in the effectuation of proscriptions on dis-
crimination:
Management prerogatives, and union freedoms are to be left un-
disturbed to the greatest extent possible. Internal affairs of em-
ployers and labor organizations must not be interfered with ex-
cept to the limited extent that correction is required in discrimi-
nation practices. 49
By 1967, however, the EEOC felt compelled to issue a new set
of regulations on religious discrimination.50 They were formulated
because the EEOC had received "several -complaints" that had raised
the question whether the discharge of an employee or the refusal
to hire a prospective employee because of refusals to work on Sabbath
days or other religious holidays was unlawful.5 ' Although the EEOC
did not expressly repeal its 1966 regulations,52 its new position was
substantially different. The Commission stated that the duty not to
discriminate, mandated by Title VII, 53 included
an obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable
accommodations to the religious needs of employees and pro-
reads:
However, the Commission believes that an employer is free under Title
VII to establish a normal work week (including paid holidays) generally
applicable to all employees, notwithstanding that this schedule may not op-
erate with uniformity in its effect upon the religious observances of his em-
ployees. For example, an employer who is closed for business on Sunday
does not discriminate merely because he requires that all his employees be
available for work on Saturday.
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (3) (1966), as amended 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967)
reads:
The employer may prescribe the normal work week and foreseeable
overtime requirements, and, absent an intent on the part of the employer
to discriminate on religious grounds, a job applicant or employee who ac-
cepted the job knowing or having reason to believe that such requirements
would conflict with his religious obligations is not entitled to demand any
alterations in such requirements to accommodate his religious needs.
47. Id.
48. Reid v. Memphis Pub. Co., 521 F.2d 512, 518 (6th Cir. 1975) (dicta
within majority opinion); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 335 (6th
Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
49. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2516 (1964).
50. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967), formerly 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1966). The new
regulations took effect on July 10, 1967. Id.
51. The EEOC reported 87 complaints during its first year of existence. Com-
ment, Religious Observance and Discrimination on Employment, 22 SYR. L. Rnv.
1019, 1020 n.1 (1971).
52. Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583, 589 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd other
grounds, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).




spective employees where such accommodations can be made
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's busi-
ness.
5 4
Because of the "particularly sensitive"5 5 questions involved, the bur-
den of proving the existence of undue hardship was placed upon the
employer.56 The satisfaction of this burden was to be determined
"largely on an ad-hoc basis."
'57
B. Application of the Rules of Reasonable Accommodation
The initial step in a determination whether reasonable accom-
modation is necessitated is a showing by the employee or prospective
employee of a prima facie case of religious discrimination.5  The
burden then shifts to the employer (or, in an appropriate case, to the
labor union) to show either that no accommodation is possible or that
such accommodations that are possible cannot be made without
undue hardship.59
In 1973, it was observed that there was a "lack of authoritative
precedent" concerning the application of reasonable accommoda-
tion. 60  This remains true. Even a sharp increase during the past
two years6' in the number of cases involving religious discrimination
has failed to resolve several questions in this area. One such question
is whether an employer (or union) can prove the existence of undue
hardship without actually attempting an accommodation. 2 Conced-
54. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1967), formerly 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1966).
55. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(c) (1967), formerly 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1966).
56. Id.
57. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 1970), aHf'd
by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
58. E.g., Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 143 (5th
Cir. 1975); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172, 178 (W.D.N.C.
1975).
59. Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172, 179 (W.D.N.C.
1975).
60. Claybaugh v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Ore. 1973).
61. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted,
424 U.S. 942 (1976); Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th
Cir. 1975); Hardison v. TWA, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975); Young v. Southwestern
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975); Yott v. North Am. Rockwell
Corp., 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F.
Supp. 172 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Ward v. Allegheny Ludlam Steel Corp., 397 F. Supp.
375 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Dixon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D.
Neb. 1974); Drum v. Ware, 7 EPD % 9244 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Weitkenaut v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284 (D. Vt. 1974); EEOC Dec. 74-107,
CCH EEOC DEC % 6430 (1974).
62. Compare Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520
(6th Cir. 1975), with Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircr. Serv., Inc., 373 F.
edly there may be instances in which any possible accommodation
would so clearly impose an undue hardship on the employer that an
actual attempt at accommodation would be wasteful. The employer's
burden is not satisfied by a mere opinion or allegation of hardship,
however,63 and the rarity of an exceedingly clear case of undue
hardship is additional evidence that the view which requires an
attempt at accommodation is more realistic. 4
Questions have also arisen concerning the proper relationship of
the two statutory phrases "reasonable accommodation" and "undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." Evaluation of the
employer's obligation is often considered to be a two-step process in
which separate determinations are made of the existence of possible
accommodations and the existence of undue hardship in implement-
ing those accommodations.6 5  Nevertheless, the two phrases do not
establish two standards. Most cases interpret the statutory language
to mean that if an accommodation is not found to impose an undue
hardship, it is reasonable. 66
Crucial to the application of the statute, therefore, are defini-
tions of its two key phrases. "Reasonable accommodation" has been
held to mean more than a mere absence of intentional discrimina-
tion. 7 It must be made in good faith and consider all aspects of the
employee's religious beliefs. For instance, when an employee's reli-
gion forbids not only working on the Sabbath but also asking another
to substitute, an accommodation that would permit absence only if a
replacement worker were found would not be considered reasona-
Supp. 937, 941-42 (M.D. Ala. 1974) and Claybaugh v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co.,
355 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D. Ore. 1973).
63. E.g., Johnson v. United States Postal Service, 497 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir.
1974); Hardison v. TWA, 375 F. Supp. 877, 888 (W.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975); EEOC Dec. 70-670 (3/30/70), CCH
EEOC DEC V 6141 (1970).
64. Support for the view that an attempt at accommodation should be required
before a finding of undue hardship can be made is seen in the admonition of one
judge that "sometimes things that you think can't be done, if you try, work far better
than you anticipate." Roberts v. Hermitage Cotton Mills, 8 EPD 9589 (D.S.C.),
a/fd, 8 EPD 9589 (4th Cir. 1974). A contrary result to such experimentation
is suggested by a decision in an analogous context: "[AIll too often theories which
may seem to be reasonable and logical when viewed alone or in the abstract prove
to be highly artificial once they are exposed to every day realities." Willingham v.
Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 352 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (M.D. Ga. 1972) (alleged sex dis-
crimination in dress code requirements).
65. See Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th
Cir. 1975); Dixon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 385 F. Supp. 1382, 1387 (D. Neb.
1974); EEOC Dec. 72-2066 (6/22/72), CCH EEOC DEC 6367 (1972).
66. E.g., Dixon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 385 F. Supp. 1382, 1387 (D. Neb.
1974); EEOC Dec. 72-0606 (12/22/71), CCH EEOC DEC T 6310 (1972); EEOC
Dec. 70-670 (3/30/70), CCH EEOC DEC 6141 (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(d)
(1967), amending 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1966).
67. Hardison v. TWA, 375 F. Supp. 877, 881 (W.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
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ble.66 "Undue hardship" has been defined as "something more than
hardship. ' 09  There has been a trend to construe the phrase "on the
conduct of the employer's business" as including undue hardship
imposed upon the individual's fellow employees and labor union as
well as the employer itself. 0 This is because employee relations and
the concomitant problems of grievances and general morale difficul-
ties definitely affect the employer's business.7 ' Even with this en-
largement of the scope of its definition, the existence of "undue
hardship" is difficult to prove. Inconvenience in re-scheduling em-
ployees to accommodate a sabbatarian has been held insufficient to
constitute undue hardship.72  Similarly, the fact that an accommoda-
tion is "bothersome" or "disruptive" 73 is also insufficient. The neces-
sity of finding and paying a substitute and even the training of a
replacement7 4 do not necessarily constitute undue hardship. "Grum-
bling" or other manifestations of resentment by fellow employees is
not enough to support a claim of undue hardship75 unless such
"grumbling" is so severe that it results in "chaotic personnel prob-
lems."76  Ordinarily, neither an employee's attire77 nor his conduct
68. Compare Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 331 (6th Cir.
1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) with 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(j) (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
69. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir.
1975); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 551 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 424 U.S. 942 (1976).
70. E.g., Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.
1974); Hardison v. TWA, 375 F. Supp. 877, 882 (W.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975); Roberts v. Hermitage Cotton Mills,
8 EPD 9589 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 8 EPD 9596 (4th Cir. 1974).
71. "The hardship on employees should certainly be considered as hardship on
the conduct of business, for the management of employees is one of the chief con-
cerns of a large business. . . ." Hardison v. TWA, 375 F. Supp. 877, 883 (W.D.
Mo. 1974), rev'd in part on other grounds, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
72. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir.
1975); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 424 U.S. 942 (1976); Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892, 895
(E.D. Ark. 1972). To equate inconvenience with undue hardship has been likened
to an "Alice in Wonderland world, where words have no meaning." Cummins v.
Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d at 550, quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 354
(1970) (concurring opinion by Harlan, J.).
73. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir.
1975), reh. denied, 527 F.2d 515 (1976).
74. Ward v. Allegheny Ludlam Steel Corp., 397 F. Supp. 375. 377 (W.D. Pa.
1975); EEOC Dec. 72-0606 (12/22/72), CCH EEOC DEC 6310 (1972).
75. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520-21 (6th
Cir. 1975), quoting Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1975),
cert. granted, 424 U.S. 942 (1976).
76. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 424 U.S. 942 (1976); EEOC Dec. 72-0606 (12/22/71), CCH EEOC DEC
6310 (1972); EEOC Dec. 71-463 (11/13/70), CCH EEOC DEC 6206 (1972).
77. E.g., EEOC Dec. 71-779 (12/21/70), CCH EEOC DEC 6180 (1973).
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on the job (such as soft praying while working) 78 are considered
undue hardship.
Nonetheless, there are several ways by which an employer can
attempt to defeat an employee's demand for accommodation. The
most obvious is a challenge to the sincerity of the employee's beliefs. 79
Although in the majority of cases this will not be an issue,80 a
successful defense of insincerity naturally ends the proceeding.8' Even
when sincerity cannot be challenged, other circumstances may be
sufficient to show the requisite hardship. One such circumstance is
the smallness of the employer's business. If the employer is an
exceptionally large corporation, an allegation of undue hardship will
be viewed with skepticism. 2  Conversely, if the employer is small,
such allegation is more likely to succeed. 3 This may also be applica-
ble where the individual work location is small even though the
employer is not. Thus, in Johnson v. United States Postal Service 4 a
post office employee was denied accommodation because the individ-
ual post office in which he worked lacked sufficient manpower to
implement it.5  Another circumstance upon which a finding of
undue hardship can be based is the type of job held by the employee
seeking accommodation. When the job calls for skills or expertise
unique to the individual a sabbatarian's demand for a full day off may
well be denied; 6 likewise when the job is part of 24-hour emergency
service necessary to protect the public safety. 7 Even a predominant
characteristic of the other employees can be determinative in proving
a claim of undue hardship. In Roberts v. Hermitage Cotton Mills"8 a
78. E.g., Smith v. Universal Services, Inc., 6 EPD 8919 (E.D. La. 1971).
79,. E.g., Cooper v. General Dynamics, Convair Aerosp. Div., Fort Worth
Oper., 378 F. Supp. 1258, 1260 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
80. E.g., Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172, 174 n.1
(W.D.N.C. 1975); Drum v. Ware, 7 EPD 9244 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Kettell v. John-
son & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892, 895 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Dawson v. Mizell, 325 F.
Supp. 511, 513 (E.D. Va. 1971).
81. See note 247 and accompanying text infra.
82. Claybaugh v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Ore. 1973).
83. E.g., Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircr. Serv., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937,
941 (M.D. Ala. 1974). The duty to accommodate does not apply to employers of
less than fifteen persons. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1972).
84. 497 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1974).
85. Id. at 129-30.
86. E.g., Reid v. Memphis Pub. Co., 521 F.2d 512, 522 (6th Cir. 1975); EEOC
Dec. 70-773 (5/7/70), CCH EEOC DEC 70-773 (1970).
87. Dixon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 385 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 (D. Neb.
1974); Scott v. Southern California Gas Co., 8 EPD 9450 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
Analogous to these situations is a case decided on first amendment grounds in
which police officers were required to shave their beards grown in observance of their
religion. Cupit v. Baton Rouge Police Dep't, - La. App. -, 277 So. 2d 454 (1973).
The beards conflicted with police regulations based upon the appearance felt neces-
sary to promote the image of a policeman and thereby protect the public welfare.
Id. at -, 277 So. 2d at 456.
88. 8 EPD f 9589 (D.S.C.), affd, 8 EPD 9596 (4th Cir. 1974).
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worker's request for time off on his Sabbath was denied principally
because such accommodation would have necessitated his co-workers,
mostly senior citizens, to work extended shifts.8 9 Undue hardship
can also be grounded on a showing that accommodation will threaten
the safety of the other employees.90 When no undue hardship can be
shown and reasonable accommodation has been implemented, the
employer may still avoid such accommodation upon showing that the
employee refuses to cooperate.9
One factor that has often been applied in the assessment of
undue hardship claims, but which should logically be omitted, is the
relative good faith or "equities" of the parties. An employee's lack of
good faith in failing to cooperate after an accommodation has been
attempted is certainly relevant to an employer's claim that such
accommodation should not be continued.92 In contrast, however, the
equities of either side before a decision as to the necessity of accom-
modation has been made is irrelevant. The sole question posed by
the Civil Rights Act is whether the employee can be accommodated
without undue hardship.9" If such accommodation can be made
without hardship, it must be. No extraneous "equitable" considera-
tions should enter into the decision.9 4  These considerations have
included recognition that the employee volunteered for extra work95
and that the employee failed to check with his crew informally before
requesting accommodation.96 One blatant example of this misappli-
cation of "equitable" factors is a decision of the EEOC in which one
of the reasons for finding undue hardship in the hiring of a Seventh-
Day Adventist was the employer's demonstration of "good faith" in
accommodating the prospective employee's mother for years previous-
89. Id.
90. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 521 (6th Cir.
1975).
91. See, e.g., Roberts v. Hermitage Cotton Mills, 8 EPD 9589 (D.S.C.),
aff'd, 8 EPD 9596 (4th Cir. 1974).
92. Id.
93. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
94. Enforcement of reasonable accommodation is concededly subject to a rule
of "equitable application." 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(d) (1967), formerly 29 C.F.R. §
1605.1 (1966). This emphasizes that accommodation is a flexible concept dependent
upon facts of each case rather than that previous "equities" of the parties are to be
considered.
95. E.g., Ward v. Allegheny Ludlam Steel Corp., 397 F. Supp. 375, 377 (W.D.
Pa. 1975); Weitkenaut v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284, 1286 (D.
Vt. 1974).
96. EEOC Dec. 72-2066 (6/22/72); CCH EEOC DEC 6367 (1972).
ly. 7 Another more frequent example is a consideration of when the
employee adopted his religious beliefs in relation to the time at which
he accepted the position or shift from which he requests accommoda-
tion. In determining whether a reasonable accommodation can be
made it should make no difference whether the employee adopted his
belief before or after he accepted the conflicting employment.9 s Yet
several cases have taken such facts into consideration. 99
This problem has been recognized by at least one court. In
Hardison,10 an employee used his seniority to transfer into a shift
which gave him evenings free with his new bride.10' In his former
shift he needed no accommodation for his religious beliefs. Accom-
modation was necessary after his transfer. Thus an employee delib-
erately placed himself into a shift for personal reasons out of which he
then demanded accommodation for religious reasons. A misuse of
"equitable" considerations would probably have dictated that the
employee choose between his religious and personal demands. The
error of such an approach is that it overlooks the fact that the
employer's duty to accommodate is dependent upon only one consid-
eration: his ability to do so without undue hardship." 2 The court
correctly held that the circumstances were not grounds for denying
accommodation.10 3  Rather, in light of a collective bargaining agree-
ment preventing transfers without seniority (of which the employee
now had none), these circumstances were merely a factor frustrating
the employer's attempts at accommodation.10
III. Challenges to the Rule of Reasonable Accommodation
A. Inconsistency with the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The 1967 regulations creating the duty of reasonable accommo-
dation were adopted into statute by Congress in 1972.105 Neverthe-
less, the rule was challenged in dicta by the Sixth Circuit in the 1975
97. EEOC Dec. 70-99 (8/27/69), CCH EEOC DEC 6060 (1969).
98. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1966), as amended 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967).
See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
99. E.g., Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 518 (6th
Cir. 1975); Johnson v. United States Postal Service, 497 F.2d 128, 129 (5th Cir.
1974); Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892, 893 (E.D. Ark. 1972) (ob-
tained job before adopting religious views); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113,
1114 (5th Cir. 1972); Drum v. Ware, 7 EPD 1 9244 (W.D.N.C. 1974) (obtained
job afterward).
100. 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
101. 375 F. Supp. 877, 891 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
102. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
103. 375 F. Supp. 877, 891 (W.D. Mo .1974), rev'd in part on other grounds,
527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
104. Id.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) '(1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
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case of Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co.'"8 This challenge as-
serts that the rule is inconsistent with the intent of Congress as
expressed in the original Civil Rights Act of 1964.107 The allegation
is that the rule is a constitutionally impermissible usurpation of the
legislative function by the EEOC as applied to cases arising before the
1972 amendment, and perhaps to all cases.108
The position expressed in the Reid dicta is an isolated one. It is
the only challenge that has been made to the rule on the ground of
statutory inconsistency since the enactment of the 1972 amendment.
In fact, the Reid dicta is a repudiation of the approval that the Sixth
Circuit had given the rule in the Cummins decision'09 less than three
months earlier. The only relevant decisions subsequent to Reid have
rejected its dicta and have relegated its mention to footnotes. 110 One
of these subsequent decisions is from the Sixth Circuit, representing a
second reversal of position by that circuit within nine months."' The
ambivalence of the Sixth Circuit and the fact that this issue will be of
first impression before the United States Supreme Court" 2 in Cum-
mins warrant a close examination of the opposing rationales.
The reasoning of the Reid dicta closely resembles that of a 1970
Sixth Circuit case, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co."' Dewey
presented the first challenge to the rule of reasonable accommodation.
In Dewey an employee alleged that his discharge in 1966 for refusing
to work on Sundays for religious reasons constituted a violation of the
Civil Rights Act." 4  The employer's defense was that it had merely
acted in accord with a collective bargaining agreement that applied to
all employees uniformly and required weekend work as compulsory
106. 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975).
107. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
108. 521 F.2d at 520 (dicta within majority opinion).
109. See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra.
110. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 n.2 (6th Cir.
1975); Hardison v. TWA, 527 F.2d 33, 38 n.5 (8th Cir. 1975).
111. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Ci.
reh. denied, 527 F.2d 515 (1976).
112. Reid v. Memphis Pub. Co., 521 F.2d 512, 524 n.1 (6th Cir. 1975) (dis-
sent).
113. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), alf'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S.
689 (1971).
Certainly a partial explanation of the similarity of Reid and Dewey is that one
judge, the Hon. Paul C. Weick, wrote both the Reid decision and the denial of rehear-
ing in Dewey. See note 164 infra.
114. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709, 711 (W.D. Mich. 1969),
rev'd, 424 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
overtime to be assigned on the basis of seniority.11 5 It was stipulated
that the employer had made no accommodation to the employee's
religious beliefs other than to permit him to find a substitute worker,"'
a procedure which allowed for absences of all types but which was
unavailable to the employee because it too was forbidden by his re-
ligion."17 Because both a reasonable accommodation and a showing
of undue hardship were lacking," 8 the employer's defense depended
entirely upon whether the 1967 regulations requiring accommodation
were to be applied. The district court held for the employee." 9  In
so doing, it expressly adopted the 1967 regulations as definitive of
the statutory duty not to discriminate. 2 ' The court of appeals for
the Sixth Circuit reversed.
121
A sufficient ground for reversal was the appellate court's deci-
sion that the district court had erred in applying the 1967 guidelines
retroactively. 122  More important as precedent, however, was the
court's ruling that the duty of reasonable accommodation was not
imposed by the Civil Rights Act. 2  The court stated that the Act
was aimed only at discriminatory practices. 24 It then declared that a
collective bargaining agreement that imposed a uniform rule on all
employees was not discriminatory, despite the unequal impact the
agreement might have on the religious needs of individual employ-
ees.125 The existing authority for such a distinction between applica-
tion and impact, Sherbert v. Verner,126 was ruled inapplicable in that
it involved state rather than private action. 2  Therefore, no discrim-
ination was seen in the employer's failure to accommodate; to equate
discrimination and failure to accommodate was held "fundamental
error" because they are "entirely different.' 12  The EEOC's authori-
ty to impose a duty of reasonable accommodation was "doubted"' 29
since this imposition was held to have been inconsistent'I 0 with the
expressed congressional intent that the Commission avoid interference
115. 429 F.2d at 327.
116. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709, 711 (W.D. Mich. 1969),
rev'd, 424 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
117. Id. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
118. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
119. 300 F. Supp. at 711.
120. ld. at 714.
121. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 1970), a 'd
by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
122. Id. at 329.
123. Id. at 330.
124. Id. at 328.
125. Id.
126. 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
127. 429 F.2d at 329.
128. Id. at 335.
129. Id. at 331 n.1.
130. Id. at 334.
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with the internal affairs of employers and labor organizations. 31
Furthermore, it was thought that application of the reasonable ac-
commodation rule would create "chaotic personnel problems,' '13 2
raise constitutional issues concerning the Establishment Clause, 13 8
and interfere with private contractual obligations.1
3 4
Despite serious flaws in its reasoning,'35 the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Dewey was affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court.1 6 The affirmance had no effect as precedent, however,
because it was the result of an equally divided court. 3 7  The EEOC
criticized the Dewey decision' 18 and continued to apply the rule of
reasonable accommodation in its administrative proceedings. 13 9 Dew-
ey was followed by several state'40 and federal' 4' courts.
Over the last four years, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Dewey has
had little worth as precedent. There are five reasons for this. The first
is the recognition by several federal courts that the statements made in
Dewey regarding the invalidity of the 1967 regulations were merely
dicta. The actual basis for reversal was the district court's error in
retroactively applying the 1967 regulations. 142  A second reason is
131. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
132. 429 F.2d at 330.
133. Id. at 334.
134. 429 F.2d at 330; cf. Reid v. Memphis Pub. Co., 521 F.2d 512, 524 n.1 (6th
Cir. 1975).
135. See notes 143-64 and accompanying text infra.
136. 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
137. The rule that an affirmance by an equally divided court establishes no prec-
edent is a fundamental part of American jurisprudence. E.g., Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960); Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 113 (1869).
The Dewey court also considered the major question of whether a complainant
under title VII was foreclosed from bringing a legal action after seeking redress
through the arbitration proceedings prescribed by a collective bargaining agreement
and receiving an adverse decision therefrom. The automatic affirmance caused by
the equally divided High Court is therefore "particularly obscure" since it gives no
indication of which issue caused the split. Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc.,
478 F.2d 979, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1973); accord, Reid v. Memphis Pub. Co., 521 F.2d
512, 513 n.2 (6th Cir. 1975); EEOC Dec. 72-0606 (12/22/71), CCH EEOC DEC
6310 (1971). See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Corp., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)
(adverse arbitration decision does not foreclose title VII remedy).
138. E.g., EEOC Dec. 72-0606 (12/22/71), CCH EEOC DEC 6310 (1971).
139. EEOC Dec. 72-0606 (12/22/71), CCH EEOC DEC 6310 (1971); EEOC
Dec. 70-580 (3/2/70), CCH EEOC DEC 6120 (1970).
140. E.g., Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Div., 163 Conn. 309, 307 A.2d 155 (1972);
Eastern Greyhound Lines v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 317 N.Y.S.2d
322, 27 N.Y.2d 279, 265 N.E.2d 745 (1970).
141. E.g., Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Ark. 1972);
Smith v. Universal Services, Inc., 6 EPD 8919 (E.D. La. 1971); Dawson v. Mizell,
325 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1971).
142. Reid v. Memphis Pub. Co., 468 F.2d 346, 349 (6th Cir. 1972); Riley v.
Dewey's invalidation of the 1967 regulations without having given
any consideration to a decision by the Supreme Court as to the weight
to be given administrative interpretation of statutes. As the dissent in
Dewey noted, the High Court had stated in Udall v. Tallman,143 that
When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this
Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the stat-
ute by the officers or agency charged with its administration...
'Particularly is this respect due when the administrative practice
"involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the
men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in
motion; of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while
they are yet untried and new." '144
The third reason nullifying Dewey's repudiation of reasonable
accommodation is its erroneous evaluation of congressional intent.
The court's statement that Congress aimed the Civil Rights Act only
at discriminatory practices 145 was correct. 146 Yet this statement can-
not by itself make the rule of reasonable accommodation inconsistent
with the intent of the Act. It begs the question of how "discriminato-
ry" was to be defined. The court offered an answer to that question
in its statement that Congress did not intend a collective bargaining
agreement with uniformly applicable rules to be considered discrimi-
natory.147  Its authority for that conclusion was the expressed con-
gressional intent that "management prerogatives" and "[t]he internal
affairs of employers ... [were] not to be interfered with except to
the limited extent that correction is required in discrimination prac-
tices."' 48  The error in the court's reliance on that expression of
intent is revealed in the final phrase. The language shows clearly
that Congress did not intend all internal policies of employers to be
immune from regulation. Rather, only those that were not discrimi-
natory were to be left alone. The type of employer policies that were
to be considered "discriminatory" was not described by Congress.
The Dewey court was thus unwarranted in assuming that Congress
intended to consider work rules uniform in application but unequal in
impact to be non-discriminatory.
Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1972); Hardison v. TWA, 375 F. Supp.
877, 886 (W.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
143. 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
144. Id. at 16, quoting Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec-
tricians, 367 U.S. 398, 408 (1961); accord, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
433 (1971); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172, 178 (W.D.N.C.
1975); Hardison v. TWA, 375 F. Supp. 877, 887 (W.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975); Jackson v. Veri Fresh Poultry, Inc., 304 F.
Supp. 1276, 1277 (E.D. La. 1969).
145. 429 F.2d at 328.
146. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
147. 429 F.2d at 334.
148. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
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In fact, there is considerable support for the view that Congress
intended the opposite result.'49 One year before the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act, 5 ° the United States Supreme Court in Sherbert v.
Vermer' 1 struck down a state statute that uniformly required availa-
bility for Saturday work as a prerequisite to the reception of state
employment benefits. Because it forced a Seventh-Day Adventist
who observed a Saturday Sabbath to choose between the precepts of
her religion and her only means of income, 152 the uniformly-applied
statute was deemed a violation of the Free Exercise Clause'"3 because
of the inequality of its effect. The Court declared:
For if the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observ-
ance of one or all religions or to discriminate invidiously between
religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the bur-
den may be characterized as being 'only indirect."15 4
Thus the Supreme Court recognized that discrimination was properly
defined in terms of effect as well as application. Absent a definition
of its own,' 55 it is unlikely that Congress would have ignored this
definition of discrimination stated but one year earlier by the nation's
highest court.
This argument that employment practices discriminatory only in
effect can nonetheless violate Title VII was offered by the district
court in Dewey. 156  The Sixth Circuit rejected the application of
Sherbert because that case "involved state, and not private action."'1 5
7
This distinction is insufficient. It had been anticipated and answered
by the district court:
In relation to Sherbert, one might question its relevance,
since in that case there was 'state action,' while in the instant
case there is only private action. That distinction would be im-
149. See, e.g., EEOC Dec. 71-779 (12/21/70), CCH EEOC DEC 6180
(1970); EEOC Dec. 70-580 (3/2/70), CCH EEOC DEC 6120 (1970).
150. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
151. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
152. Id. at 404. Many Title VII actions in which an employer's failure to grant
weekend time off for religious reasons is challenged as discrimination on the basis
of religion are brought by Seventh-Day Adventists, since the Sabbath of that religion
is observed from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. E.g., Reid v. Memphis Pub.
Co., 468 F.2d 346, 347 (6th Cir. 1972); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1114
(5th Cir. 1972); Dawson v. Mizell, 325 F. Supp. 511, 512 (E.D. Va. 1971); Jackson
v. Veri Fresh Poultry, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1276, 1277 (E.D. La. 1969).
153. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
154. 374 U.S. at 404, quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)
(emphasis added).
155. See notes 145-46 and accompanying text supra.
156. 300 F. Supp. at 74.
157. 429 F.2d at 329.
portint if this opinion were dealing with whether defendant's
overtime rule is constitutional. But the issue before the court
is whether the defendant has violated a federal statute-a stat-
ute which restricts the activities of private employers and does
not require 'state action.' The importance of Sherbert to this
analysis is not its holding on constitutionality, but its definition
of discrimination-a definition which is equally valid whether
employed to measure private or state action. 158
The Sherbert decision's declaration that the unequal effect of a
rule is as much discrimination as its unequal application was con-
firmed and extended to Title VII actions by the Supreme Court a
decision rendered subsequent to Dewey. 59 This is the fourth reason
for heavily discounting the statements in Dewey that Congress did not
intend a uniform employer policy to be found discriminatory. In
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 60 the Court ruled that the effect of
private as well as public regulations can render the regulations dis-
criminatory even though their application is uniform and in good
faith. The Court stated:
The [Civil Rights] Act [of 1964] proscribes not only overt dis-
crimination but also practices that are fair in form 'but discrim-
inatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity ...
[A]bsence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures .... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motiva-
tion.'
6'
Although Griggs addressed the problems of racial discrimination,' 62
many courts have seen a clear analogy to the situation in which a
uniformly-applied company policy or collective bargaining agreement
discriminates against employees whose religious beliefs conflict with
the established rules.' 63  Even the Sixth Circuit, which propounded
Dewey, admitted in Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co. that
[w]hatever doubts there may have been about the consti-
tutionality of this regulation or its consistency with the statute
have been, we believe, laid to rest by a unanimous Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. [citation omitted]. While
Duke Power dealt with racial discrimination and our current
concern is with religious discrimination, the Equal Employment
Statute treats them similarly. The prohibitions against both
forms of discrimination (and the exceptions thereto) are usually
contained in the same sentences in the statute.' 64
158. 300 F. Supp. at 714.
159. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
160. Id. at 431.
161. Id. at 431-32.
162. The allegation in Griggs was that the effect of tests required by the em-
ployer for job promotion discriminated against black employees even though the tests
were administered uniformly and in good faith. Id. at 428.
163. Reid v. Memphis Pub. Co., 468 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 1972); Riley v.
Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir. 1972); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l
Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172, 178 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
164. 468 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 1972). The author of this opinion was the
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
AfterGriggs, the next chronological development furnishes the
strongest evidence that the Dewey decision must be considered an
'inaccurate appraisal of congressional intent. Appropriately, this evi-
dence was furnished by Congress itself. In 1972 Congress enacted
an amendment' 6" to the Civil Rights Act of 1964166 that incorporated
the EEOC's regulations' 67 into the statute. This was done expressly
to nullify the effect of Dewey. 68 The achievement of this congres-
sional goal is shown by an increasing recognition in the federal courts
that the rule of reasonable accommodation reflects the will of Con-
gress not only as expressed at the time of the amendment but at the
time of the original passage of the Act as well.'69 The 1972 amend-
ment, especially when considered with the other evidence discussed
above, has been nearly dispositive in favor of the rule on the question
of its consistency with the Civil Rights Act. 170  Only the dicta in
Reid171 attacks the rule on this ground.
Hon. George Edwards, Jr. who dissented in the Sixth Circuit's 1975 decision of the
same case. See notes 25 and 113 supra.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). The
amendment was adopted by a unanimous vote of both houses of Congress. Riley v.
.Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1972).
166. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
167. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967), amending 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1966).
168. Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1972); Weitkenaut
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 n.6 (D. Vt. 1974). The
sponsor of the amendment in the Senate, Sen. Jennings Randolph of West Virginia,
remarked:
I think in the Civil Rights Act we thus intended to protect the same
rights in private employment as the Constitution protects in Federal, State,
or local governments. Unfortunately, the courts have, in a sense, come
down on both sides of this issue. The Supreme Court of the United States,
in a case involving the observance of the Sabbath and job discrimination,
divided evenly on this question.
This amendment is intended, in good purpose, to resolve by legisla-
tion-and in a way I think was originally intended by the Civil Rights
Act-that which the courts have apparently not resolved.
118 CONG. RE . 705-06 (1972). Sen. Randolph himself is a sabbatarian. Id. at 705.
705.
169. In Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir. 1972), the court
stated:
If there were any doubt as to the effect to be given to these guidelines
because of a lingering doubt as to whether they truly expressed the will of
Congress, a significant event has transpired which lays to rest any such
doubt. In an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ....
Accord, Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1974); Reid
v. Memphis Pub. Co., 468 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1972); Jordan v. North Carolina
Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172, 178 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Weitkenaut v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (D. Vt. 1974); Shaffield v. Northrop World-
wide Aircr. Serv., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937, 941 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
170. See note 169 supra.
171, 521 F.2d at 517.
Reid proposes three contentions for its argument that the rule is
invalid. The first'72 is almost identical to the contention made in
Dewey 7 ' that the 1967 regulations 7 4 were contrary to congressional
intent expressed within the Civil Rights Act. The second argu-
ment 75 is that the 1972 amendment adopting the regulations as part
of the Act is insufficient to establish a congressional intent for the
original Act. The third argument 178 is that the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power C0 .177 does not
necessitate upholding the validity of reasonable accommodation.
The dissent in Reid dismisses these contentions. It observes
78
that the issue of statutory consistency had already been resolved in
favor of the rule by the Sixth Circuit in its previous consideration of
the Reid case.179  The dissent further notes'80 that no motion for
reconsideration had been made. Even without these arguments, the
contentions of the majority's dicta must be rejected. The first conten-
tion is answered by the same reasoning that undermined Dewey's pre-
1972 assessment of congressional intent."8 ' The second contention is
unclear, but it cannot be maintained under either of two alternative
interpretations. 18 2  One interpretation is that the 1972 amendment
and the regulations it incorporates are different from the congression-
al intent expressed in 1964. Since the cause of action in Reid arose
in 1966, this is the probable meaning of the majority's assertion. If
so, it is incorrect under this comment's earlier analysis' 8 of what the
intent of Congress was in 1964. On the other hand, if the Reid
majority is stating that the amendment does not establish an expres-
sion of congressional intent as of 1972, this would contradict explicit
statements of the amendment's sponsors8 4 that an expression of
intent was precisely the amendment's purpose. In addition, it would
disregard a fundamental rule of construction that
[w]here the older statutes are silent, and where the responsibil-
ity for fashioning an effective remedy must be met by the courts,
they should look to the policies embodied in the remedial pro-
visions of the more recent statutes as a reference in shaping
remedies to the needs of the older statutes. 185
172. Id. at 518.
173. See note 113 supra.
174. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967), amending 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1966).
175. 521 F.2d at 520.
176. Id.
177. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See notes 160-163 and accompanying text supra.
178. 521 F.2d at 524.
179. Reid v. Memphis Pub. Co., 468 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1972).
180. 521 F.2d at 523.
181. See notes 145-158 and accompanying text supra.
182. See note 108 and accompanying text supra.
183. See notes 145-158 and accompanying text supra.
184. See note 168 and accompanying text supra.
185. Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1972), quoting Lee
v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1971).
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There is also ambiguity in the majority's third contention. If the
majority is merely saying that no accommodation is required under
the facts of Reid, arguably it is correct. If, however, the contention is
that Griggs requires no accommodation in any case, it would have to
yield to the Griggs holding that employment practices which are
discriminatory only in effect can still violate Title VII. An effect
discriminatory on religious grounds cannot be removed without an
accommodation.
The foregoing analysis and the weight of authority require that
the dicta offered in the Reid decision be given no weight in the
determination of whether the rule of reasonable accommodation is
and has been a valid reflection of congressional intent. The United
States Supreme Court should have little difficulty in upholding the
rule against a challenge on the ground of statutory inconsistency.
B. Violative of the Establishment Clause
The second issue that will be confronting the Supreme Court in
Cummins v. Parker Seal Co. 186 is whether the imposition of the
duty to reasonably accommodate the religious observances and prac-
tices of an employee is violative of the first amendment's Establish-
ment Clause.18 The assertion that reasonable accommodation is
void on this ground is the argument that accommodation creates an
impermissible preference for a particular religious belief.188  This
issue arises primarily because the rule allows Sabbatarians with low
seniority 89 to avoid weekend work' 90 while non-Sabbatarian col-
186. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 424 U.S. 942 (1976).
187. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
188. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 555 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 424 U.S. 942 (1976) (dissent); Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination
and the Role of Arbitration Under Title V1I, 69 MICH. L. REv. 599, 628 (1971).
189. Seniority is usually the determinative factor in the assignment of desirable
work shifts. Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038, 1046 (3d Cir. 1973);
Dawson v. Mizell, 325 F. Supp. 511, 514 (E.D. Va. 1971). Cf. Shaffield v. Northrop
Worldwide Aircr. Serv., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937, 942 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
190. Several religions observe a Sabbath from sundown Friday until sundown
Saturday. E.g., Weitkenaut v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284, 1285
(D. Vt. 1974) (New Apostolic Church); Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp.
892, 893 (E.D. Ark. 1972) (Radio Church of God); EEOC Dec. 70-580 (3/2/70),
CCH EEOC DEC 6120 (1970) (Holy Church of the Living God); see note 152
supra. (Seventh-Day Adventist). Workshifts on weekend days are generally con-
sidered undesirable. Drum v. Ware, 7 EPD 9244 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Scott v.
Southern California Gas Co., 8 EPD 9450 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
leagues with equally low seniority must accept such work19' and even
those with sufficient seniority to earn weekends off must nonetheless
report during such periods to replace those absent. 192 This issue split
the Sixth Circuit in its adjudication of the Cummins case. The
majority upheld the rule of reasonable accommodation against this
challenge."'
The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof."19 4 These proscriptions have been interpreted to mean
that government must be neutral both between religious believers and
non-believers and between particular religious groups. 195 Specifical-
ly, the United States Supreme Court has stated in Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist'9 6 that to avoid unconstitutionality -under
the Establishment Clause a law "must reflect a clearly secular legisla-
tive purpose, second, must have a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion, . . . and, third, must avoid excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion, . . .1' 97 Both the majority and the
dissent in Cummins apply this tripartite test' 98 in reaching opposite
conclusions on the constitutionality of the reasonable accommodation
rule. An analysis of the two arguments will reveal that the rule
should be upheld on this issue.
-.. The first test under the Nyquist standards indicates that the
statute "must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose."' 99  The
majority offers a two-pronged argument in contending that reasona-
ble accommodation has such a secular purpose. First, it argues that
such secular purpose exists in that the rule was intended to "put teeth
into"' ° the proscriptions on religious discrimination in force when
the rule was promulgated.' l Second, the majority declares that the
rule has other secular purposes of a pragmatic nature.2 °2 These
pragmatic considerations include a legislative recognition that certain
191. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 555 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 424 U.S. 942 (1976) (dissent).
192. Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration
Under Title VII, 69 MICH. L. REV. 599, 628 (1971).
193. 516 F.2d at 551.
194. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
195. E.g., Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485, 490 (6th Cir. 1975). Neutrality has
been described as "the heart of the religion clauses of the First Amendment." Cum-
mins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 555 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 424 U.S.
942 (1976) (dissent).
196. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
197. Id. at 772-73.
198. 516 F.2d at 551 and 556.
199. See note 197 and accompanying text supra.
200. 516 F.2d at 551.
201. The proscriptions were effectuated by 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967), amend-
ing 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1966).
202. 516 F.2d at 552.
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persons will not compromise their religious beliefs, no matter what
the consequences might be.2"' These persons should not be punished
for following their consciences, for to do so would impair the ideals
of a democratic society.
20 4
The dissent takes exception to both of the majority's arguments.
It states that while the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964205 in
eliminating discrimination on the basis of religion was clearly secular,
that purpose was defeated by the 1972 amendment to the Act.20 6 The
amendment's incorporation of the reasonable accommodation rule is
said to have resulted in discrimination by giving preference to those
accommodated. The dissent answers the majority's second conten-
tion by asserting that even without a requirement of reasonable
accommodation persons whose religious observances conflict with
work rules would not be punished for obeying their consciences.
Instead, the dissent feels that the employee and employer would
resolve the matter privately. Therefore, if Congress sought to protect
the consciences of those whose beliefs conflict with job requirements,
it sought only to protect particular religious views, a clearly non-
secular purpose.
The minority position is in error on two points. Accommoda-
tion does not create a preference of one religious belief. Rather, it
preserves equality of all religious (and non-religious) beliefs by
permitting those whose observances conflict with job requirements to
be able to enjoy such observances equally with those whose observ-
ances (or lack thereof) do not so conflict. This is the very neutrality
which the Establishment Clause demands.20 7 Furthermore, without
a statutory requirement of accommodation, employers and individual
203. 516 F.2d at 552. The court analogized to Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437 (1971), in which an individual claiming draft exemption as a conscientious
objector alleged that the statute controlling such determinations violated the Estab-
lishment Clause by granting exemption to adherents of religions which opposed all
wars but not to those which opposed only "unjust" ones. Gillette held that the ex-
emption rule as applied was supported by pragmatic, secular considerations including
the recognition that certain persons simply cannot be trained for combat because of
their deep abhorrence of war on religious grounds. Id. Cf. Otten v. Baltimore & 0.
R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953), in which Judge Learned Hand stated:
We must accommodate our idiosyncrasies, religious as well as secular, to the
compromises necessary in communal life; and we can hope for no reward
for the sacrifices this may require beyond our satisfaction from within, or
our expectations of a better world.
204. 516 F.2d at 552.
205. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
206. 516 F.2d at 556.
207. See note 195 and accompanying text supra.
employees would not resolve matters privately with any semblance of
equality. There would be nothing to restrain an employer from
demanding adherence to uniform rules of employment. 20 8  Thus,
reasonable accommodation resolves this Establishment Clause issue
"in a practical framework" 219 and therefore has a pragmatic non-
secular purpose.
The second test for validity under the Establishment Clause is
that a statute "must have a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion. ' 210  The majority in Cummins upholds the rule of
reasonable accommodation under this test with two arguments. It
states first that the primary effect of the rule is not the advancement
of religion but rather the assurance of job security for those whose
religious practices conflict with uniform employment regulations.2"'
This is because the rule prevents imposition of even facially neutral
rules upon employees who would suffer discrimination thereby, ex-
cept when undue hardship is shown.2 12 The majority's second point
is ithat the rule does not mandate financial support for any religion,21
a characteristic that has been termed a "primary evil. ' 214  The major-
ity contends that the sponsors of -the 1972 amendment" 5 anticipated
that the rule might result in greater attendance and concomitant
financial benefits to particular religions when applied to Sabbatarians
seeking Saturday off. 218  This result is permissible, first, because the
rule does not differentiate between religions but rather is "applicable
to all members of all religious faiths who desire Saturday as the
Sabbath; ' 217 and second, because a statute is not rendered violative of
the Establishment Clause merely because it results in some "inciden-
tal or indirect" benefit 218 to a religious institution.
208. The argument might be proposed that the employee's union would quickly
assert its power to insure equality for him in reaching an agreement with the em-
ployer. A union does have the obligation to represent all of its members, even those
constituting a minority of its total. E.g., Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S.
192 (1944); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Since accommodation of a sabbatarian with a weekend observance is often contrary
to the wishes of most employees with more seniority (see notes 189-190 and accom-
panying text supra), query how effective union sanctions such as a strike call would
be. Even discipline against non-participants would only jeopardize the union's status
as bargaining agent for the employees in the future.
209. Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172, 180 (W.D.N.C.
1975).
210. See note 197 and accompanying text supra.
211. 516 F.2d at 552.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 553.
214. Id. at 552, citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).





The dissent also offers two arguments. The first is that the rule
of reasonable accommodation discriminates between religious and
non-religious beliefs.219 The allegation is that only those who adhere
to religious views benefit by the rule. Others not only receive no
benefit but may have to take up the slack for those who do. The
dissent's second point is that the rule also discriminates among reli-
gions, because the only religious beliefs subject to the rule's relief
are those whose observance creates a conflict with work require-
ments.22 °
The majority view must prevail on this issue. The rule of
reasonable accommodation does not advance one religious belief to
the detriment of other beliefs, religious or non-religious. Rather, it
allows all religious and non-religious beliefs to be enjoyed equally by
preventing any from becoming the object of sanctions by an employ-
er. Thus its primary effect is to guarantee job security. 221 Because
reasonable accommodation merely preserves the opportunity to ob-
serve one's beliefs, religious or non-religious, it does not favor any one
view. It simply permits all beliefs to be observed equally. This is
precisely what the Constitution demands:
We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We
make room for as wide a variety of beliefs or creeds as the spir-
itual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude
on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one
group and lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents
and the appeal of its dogma. 222
By preserving the opportunity for an employee to observe his
religion without jeopardizing his employment status, the rule of rea-
sonable accommodation might indeed have the effect anticipated by
the Cummins majority of allowing a religious institution to increase
its membership and income. The financial benefits thereby gained
by the institution, however, would be incidental to the job security
assured the individual desiring to observe his religion. The majority
is correct in ruling that a statutory conferral of an incidental benefit
upon a religious institution is insufficient to bring a statute within the
proscriptions of the Establishment Clause.223
219. Id. at 558.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 552; accord, Hardison v. TWA, 375 F. Supp. 877, 888 (W.D. Mo.
1974), rev'd in part on other grounds, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
222. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 313, 314 (1952), quoted in Jordan v. North
Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172, 180 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
223. Hardison v. TWA, 375 F. Supp. .877, 888 (W.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
The third test that a statute must meet to be valid under the
Establishment Clause is the avoidance of excessive government entan-
glement with religion.224 The majority in Cummins states that the
governmental bodies charged with the enforcement of reasonable
accommodation, the courts and the EEOC, have but one function: to
determine whether a reasonable accommodation is available and, if
so, whether it would result in an undue hardship.22 5 It concludes
that the resolution of these questions "certainly does not necessitate
any government entanglement with religion." '226 The majority's ra-
tionale is that any inquiry into the genuineness of a religious observ-
ance would not exceed that presently permitted in the determination
of the genuineness of claims for property tax exemptions by religious
institutions. 227  The dissent counters by stating that enforcement of
the rule of reasonable accommodation would not only require govern-
mental inquiry into the sincerity with which religious beliefs are held
by persons seeking accommodation but would also require impermis-
sible governmental value judgments of the merits of a claimed reli-
gious observance.
Once again the argument of the majority upholding reasonable
accommodation is more persuasive. The dissent is correct in its
statement that governmental inquiry for purposes of judging the
relative merits of any religious belief or observance is clearly illegal.
The dissent is incorrect, however, in stating that mere determinations
whether a belief or observance is actually that of some religion and
that the individual is sincere in his belief are illegal. These latter
determinations are extremely limited and are solely for the purpose of
protecting an employer or union from an employee who fraudulently
claims "religious observance" to avoid weekend shifts or other unpop-
ular work. As so limited, these determinations are proper. The
mere evaluation of the sincerity with which religious beliefs are held
does not constitute an excessive entanglement of government with
religion. 28
C. Conflicts Between Reasonable Accommodation and Protected
Employee and Union Interests
1. Conflict with Seniority Privileges under the Civil Rights
Act.-A provision within the Civil Rights Act presents a major chal-
224. See note 197 and accompanying text supra.
225. 516 F.2d at 553-54.
226. Id. at 554.
227. Id.
228. There is a clear analogy between evaluations of the sincerity of an indi-
vidual's beliefs for purposes of accommodation and for purposes of acquiring con-
scientious objector status. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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lenge to the scope of the application of reasonable accommodation.
That provision states that discriminatory conduct otherwise prohibit-
ed by the Act is permissible if done "pursuant to a bona fide seniority
. . . system."229  The question arises about which is to take preced-
ence: reasonable accommodation or seniority. The court alluded to
this issue in Hardison23 ° but did not address it. Because it was not
directly raised in Cummins, perhaps the Supreme Court will make no
judgment upon it. The issue is crucial, however, since the effective-
ness of the rule of reasonable accmmodation will be nullified if the
seniority savings clause is held paramount. Most workers prefer
weekends off,23' and the fact situation in which accommodation has
most often been demanded is that of an employee who lacks sufficient
seniority to earn weekends off but nevertheless requests that time for
religious reasons.
232
A literal interpretation of the seniority provision would require
that it supersede the rule of accommodation. This literal interpreta-
tion should not be made. Reasonable accommodation should be held
superior to seniority. This is supported by several considerations.
First, it cannot be assumed that Congress enacted the 1972 amend-
ment incorporating the rule of reasonable accommodation into the
Civil Rights Act 2 33 without intending the rule to apply in the situation
in which it is most at issue. Second, those employees who lose
weekend time off so that others' religious observances are accommo-
dated have no valid claim. These employees may attempt to allege a
deprivation of a property right without due process, in violation of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.234 If the right to reasonable ac-
commodation is held to be part of the free exercise of religion
229. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964). This provision is popularly known as the
Mansfield-Dirksen Amendment. Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircr. Serv., Inc.,
373 F. Supp. 937, 942 (M.D. Ala. 1974). The provision reads in relevant part as
follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards
of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, . . . provided that such
differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of ...
religion. ...
230. 527 F.2d at 41-42.
231. See notes 189-90 supra.
232. 1 CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE 117 (1972).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
234. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; cf. Colbert v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen,
206 F.2d 9, 13 (9th Cir. 1953), quoted in Wicks v. Southern Pac. Co., 121 F. Supp.
454, 457 (S.D. Cal. 1954), aff'd, 231 F.2d 130 (1956).
guaranteed by the first amendment, however, a situation of conflict-
ing constitutional rights is presented. Accommodation should pre-
vail. Deprivation of accommodation would destroy an individual's
right to exercise his religion when it conflicts with rules imposed by
his employer or union. Denial of one element of seniority rights, the
right to choose particular times off when another employee requests
such time for religious purposes, is not as serious an infringement of
rights. Moreover, loss of this aspect of seniority is minimized be-
cause it can be shared" 5 by all those with the seniority level immedi-
ately higher than the employee seeking accommodation. Even those
employees would not have to bear the burden at all once new employ-
ees occupy that low seniority level.
A third reason why reasonable accommodation should prevail
over seniority is based on precedent. The United States Supreme
Court has said that a union has the affirmative duty to represent all of
its members, even those constituting a minority of the total member-
ship.286 This duty has been extended to negotiations for a collective
bargaining agreement.237  Therefore, unions will have to include
provisions in a negotiated collective bargaining agreement that the use
of seniority in the assignment of work shifts must yield to sincere
claims for accommodation. Claims by other union members who
must fill in for accommodated members are answered by the analysis




2. Subordination to Union Security Clauses.-Another difficult
question concerning the rule of reasonable accommodation is raised
when an employee refuses on religious grounds to either join a labor
union or pay its dues as required by a union security clause of a
collective bargaining agreement. 2 9  The issue arises when the union
demands that the employer discharge the employee in accord with the
agreement. 240 For at least two decades judicial decisions, including
235. "Rotation" of the burden on the other employees caused by accommodation
has been suggested in several cases. E.g., EEOC Dec. 70-670 (3/30/70), CCH
EEOC DEC 6141 (1970).
236. See note 208 supra.
237. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 (5th Cir. 1971); Hardison
v. TWA, 375 F. Supp. 877, 883-84 (W.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 527
F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
238. See notes 234-35 and accompanying text supra.
239. Seventh-Day Adventists hold this view because "a church member must
love his neighbor as himself and that since a church member's employer is his neigh-
bor he cannot join in such activities of a labor union such as strikes and picketing
without violating the commandment to love his neighbor." Cooper v. General Dy-
namics, Convair Aerosp. Div., Fort Worth Oper., 378 F. Supp. 1258, 1260 (N.D.
Tex. 1974). Other religions forbid membership in any type of secular organizations,
on the Biblical admonition that "Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbeliev-
ers. . . ." Wicks v. Southern Pac. Co., 231 F.2d 130, 132 n.2 (9th Cir. 1956), quot-
ing II CORIN. VI, 14.
240. See note 13 and accompanying text supra,
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those of the United States Supreme Court, have held that the first
amendment does not give an employee the right to disregard union
demands for membership or dues payment pursuant to a union
security clause.241 The rationale of these decisions is that the public
interest in a strong union and consequently the free flow of commerce
and the avoidance of industrial strife supersedes public interest in the
free exercise of religion.242 Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act,243 however, reasonable accommodation is required in these cir-
cumstances. The EEOC has made the express distinction:
We are aware of the First Amendment cases holding that
when religious practices come into conflict with labor practices
authorized by statute, a balancing of the interests involved re-
quires that free exercise of religion yield, in part, to the Congres-
sionally supported principle of the union shop [citation omitted].
These cases involve fact situations virtually identical to that pre-
sented here-the refusal of a Seventh-Day Adventist to join a
labor organization because of his religious convictions in the face
of a union shop clause in the collective bargaining agreement.
But these are not Title VII cases. * * * In those Title VII cases
where an employee refused to work on the Sabbath, in conflict
with rules or policies of the employer, an attempt at reasonable
accommodation by the employer has been required .... 244
The courts have split on this question. In Yott v. North Ameri-
can. Rockwell Corporation245 the Ninth Circuit supports the rationale
of the EEOC requiring reasonable accommodation. 240  A district
court decision 24 7 of the Fifth Circuit takes the opposite view. The
reasoning of the latter case is that those seeking to avoid union dues
are avoiding a "tax"' 248 that supports collective bargaining activities
from which they receive benefits. Moreover, union dues are seen as
essential to the preservation of peace between "neighbors," a peace
that at least one religious group deems unattainable if unions exist.249
Reasonable accommodation should be upheld in this situation. It
has been shown that Congress intended Title VII to prevent discrimi-
241. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 233 (1956); accord,
Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1974); Linscott v.
Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1971).
242. Id.
243. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
244. EEOC Dec. 74-107 (4/2/74), CCH EEOC DEC 6430 (1974).
245. 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974).
246. Id. at 403.
247. Cooper v. General Dynamics, Convair Aerosp. Div., Fort Worth Oper., 378
F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
248. Id. at 1261.
249. Id. at 1260.
nation in effect as well as in purpose.250 Since the imposition of
union membership upon those whose religion forbids such member-
ship is discriminatory in effect it should be forbidden by Title VII. In
addition, there is no reason for not requiring unions to accommodate
employees with religious scruples against joining on: the same basis as
employers are compelled to accommodate employees with analogous
scruples. Surely the loss of potential dues from a few employees will
not impair a union's bargaining power. "Grumbling" among union
members should be tolerated by unions in the same manner as it is
tolerated by employers under present law.2 51 Where the number of
adherents forbidden to join or pay dues is such that the union's
bargaining position might be weakened, the union should be permit-
ted relief only if it can prove "undue hardship" on the same basis as
any employer.
IV. Conclusion
This comment anticipates the Supreme Court's decision of
Cummins v. Parker Seal Company.252 It is strongly recommended
to the Court that it uphold the rule of reasonable accommodation.
Analysis of the challenges against the rule demonstrates conclusively
why the rule is valid. Its consistency with congressional intent has
been found repeatedly in express statements not only by the courts
but by Congress itself. Application of the strict three-legged Nyquist
tests shows that the-rule is valid under the Establishment Clause. A
balancing of interests threatened by the rule dictates that these in-
terests must be subordinated to those rights preserved by reasonable
accommodation.
Interference with the right of any person to worship as he
pleases cannot be permitted except in the clearest of cases. The
evidence offered in this comment makes the case against reasonable
accommodation only a tenuous one. The Court is urged to follow its
own precedents and those of Congress in upholding reasonable ac-
commodation.
JOHN A. CoviNo
250. See notes 145-85 and accompanying text supra.
251. See notes 75-76 and accompanying text supra.
252. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 424 U.S. 942 (1976).
